diff --git a/OPEN-QUESTIONS.md b/OPEN-QUESTIONS.md index 610c0ae..1e8ff87 100644 --- a/OPEN-QUESTIONS.md +++ b/OPEN-QUESTIONS.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ The living open-questions document for the Janus Facing Architecture, per the practice carried forward in the [2026-08-24 concept triage](jfa-concept-triage-2026-08-24.md). A stale document here means the project has stopped describing itself honestly. Each entry carries a status and names the constraints it inherits. -Four entries carry open business: readmission after trust suspension (entry 7, resolved in draft pending adoption of the bylaws amendment), sybil resistance in the governance franchise (entry 8), residential substrate constraints (entry 9, resolved in draft with its confidential-execution part still open), and the pricing of the transport fee (entry 10). The rest were resolved as raised; their record follows. +Seven entries carry open business: readmission after trust suspension (entry 7, resolved in draft pending adoption of the bylaws amendment, with procedural points open), sybil resistance in the governance franchise (entry 8), residential substrate constraints (entry 9, resolved in draft with its confidential-execution part still open), the pricing of the transport fee (entry 10, its split resolved in draft), record permanence under paid storage (entry 11, resolved in draft), the public chain's construction and funding (entry 12, funding resolved in draft, construction open), and witness adjudication against the operator (entry 13, rule resolved in draft, procedure open). The rest were resolved as raised; their record follows. ## 1. Contestability @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ Witnesses hold two jobs — record integrity and the neutral bench for cross-pla The dispute-mechanics design lets an adjudicator suspend a member's trust gate — they trade prepaid or collateralized "until the covenant readmits them." Resolved at the instrument level: readmission runs through the governance venue's appeal procedure, drafted as bylaws §2.9 (P1-001 v7.1 draft) — submission to the office of the Vice President with no PII, a one-week rating period in the appropriate Federation Channel where each member of the Vice President's circle may cast one rating on the offense, no readmission on a mode of −1, the Vice President's delegate deciding when no ratings are cast, and resubmission after a one-week cooldown. Banned operators re-enter by the same path. Final resolution follows adoption of the bylaws amendment by the membership. +**Superseded in draft (2026-10-02).** The procedure now stands in bylaws v1.1 §12.5 (draft): submission to the office of the Vice President; a one-week rating period in the concerned federation channel, administered by the office of the President; one rating each, a −1 carrying its comment; ratings, where cast, decide the petition — denied on a mode of −1, granted otherwise — and the federation's delegate decides only where no ratings are cast (principal's decision of 2026-10-02); resubmission after a ten-week cooldown; an appeal of expulsion decided within seven days. Open: (a) a tie for the mode that includes −1; (b) a challenge under §11.4, where the rated offense is the operator's, so that a −1 mode would deny the challenger rather than uphold the challenge; (c) a single rating, even the petitioner's own, now decides; (d) the seven-day limit cannot hold when the decision waits on a one-week rating period; (e) at the end of an expulsion term, no body sets the length of a further term, and the member's vote while the docket is pending is unstated; (f) "the concerned federation channel" is undefined; (g) whether a rating is a vote for §4.5 and §6.5. + **Inherits:** whether-vs-how-much (lines 8-9); trust suspension outcome (jfa-dispute-mechanics.md §4); appeals to governance venue. ## 8. Sybil resistance in the governance franchise @@ -88,13 +90,13 @@ Decided: carrier constraints are treated as a physical, adversarial environment ## 10. Pricing the transport fee -**Status:** open (2026-09-11) +**Status:** open (2026-09-11); the split resolved in draft (2026-10-01) The Record layer now cites a third sovereign spend — the orchestrator's transport fee — escrowed with the trade and released by the same citation. That much is settled: the fee follows delivery, the orchestrator cannot release its own, and it settles in the home ledger so no value crosses a community boundary. What the fee *is* remains open. Whether it is a fixed offer or may be metered per byte, per hop or per witness. A fixed offer is legible and cheap to verify; metering prices a long carry honestly but gives the orchestrator a quantity it reports about itself, which is the shape the six-fold witnessing exists to avoid. -Whether a trade between prosumers of two communities splits the fee across both home ledgers or charges the initiating side. Splitting spreads the cost the way the benefit falls; charging the initiator keeps one settlement in one ledger and avoids a second escrow that can fail independently. +Whether a trade between prosumers of two communities splits the fee across both home ledgers or charges the initiating side. Splitting spreads the cost the way the benefit falls; charging the initiator keeps one settlement in one ledger and avoids a second escrow that can fail independently. **Resolved in draft (2026-10-01):** both home ledgers split the fee, each prosumer paying their share in their own unit; the official document's Record layer now says so, and stops counting spends: if delivery is not attested, every spend reverts. Whether the paid witnesses earn credit under this same six-fold rule, and if so who witnesses them. Applied naively the rule recurses without bottom. Either witnessing is compensated substrate work already covered by the existing record-layer provision, or it needs a terminating case that has not been written. @@ -103,3 +105,35 @@ Whether the operator's witness slot is mandatory, given operators are insulated What the default commitment window is before escrow reverts. Too short and prosumer hardware with churn, sleep and relay fails honest carries; too long and capacity sits escrowed against a carry nobody will complete. **Inherits:** value stays home and cross-community exchange as paired sovereign spends (lines 3–5); privacy floor (line 7, entry 2); no chokepoint (line 11); witness minimum (entry 4); witnessing as compensated substrate work (entry 6). + +## 11. Record permanence under paid storage + +**Status:** resolved in draft (2026-10-01) + +Record permanence is bounded by paid storage. The record layer is compensated for its storage, so each holder's copy — prosumer, operator, witness, orchestrator — lasts as long as its bill is paid and ends with that holder's death or insolvency. Automation may extend some copies, but plausibly none lasts more than a few hundred years. The official document says what was committed "stays committed" (Record layer), and the dispute-mechanics design says defaults are "Recorded forever" (§5). Raised by the principal on 2026-09-30 as not necessarily a defect; the wording should match the mechanism. + +**Resolved in draft (2026-10-01):** the official document's Record layer now says that nothing is erased but no single copy is the record, names each copy's lifetime — the orchestrator's with the last paid carry, the witnesses' while the operator pays them, the parties' own until they stop keeping them, the chain's while its storage is funded — and claims for the chain only what its funding supports; the dispute-mechanics design's "Recorded forever" is reworded to match. Who funds the chain, and for how long, is settled under entry 12. + +**Inherits:** append-only record (line 6); positions and history survive any frontend (line 12); six holders (REC-six-holders); record-keeping as compensated substrate work (REC-witness-work, entry 6); defaults annotated, never erased (dispute-mechanics design §5). + +## 12. The public chain: construction, funding and lifetime + +**Status:** funding resolved in draft (2026-10-01); construction open + +The corpus fixes the chain's topology — one append-only sequence of salted hashes, types, timestamps and references, distributed across the substrate, serving everyone who holds no record of their own, and binding cross-community spends (line 5) — but not its construction: how entries are ordered, who may append, how append rights are rationed, and what happens under partition are in none of the official document, the registry, the dispute-mechanics design or this record. The Record curriculum article names the gap and makes the construction decision the Record group's first deliverable. Nor did the corpus say who pays for the chain's storage or how long it lasts: the Record frontend tier makes storage a market, "compensating the prosumers who keep the record", without naming the buyer. + +Decided by the principal on 2026-10-01: the commitments of every exchange carried by an orchestrator are copied to the chain and stored on substrate that the stewardship organization of the Governance layer funds — in NTARI's instance, the Institute, under bylaws §9.19 — so that the record which binds communities to one another is paid for by none of them. The official document's Record layer now says so, and claims for the chain only the lifetime its funding supports. + +Open: (a) construction, within line 11 (no chokepoint), line 7 (no identities) and P-lean-code — the Byzantine-agreement setting the curriculum article lays out; (b) how the Institute buys substrate storage without holding credit (bylaws §9.7) — whether the storage market takes exogenous money for this service, or the Institute funds the buyers; (c) what the funding must look like to satisfy bylaws §13.1 and §13.3 — the entries are also held by the six parties and any other party may fund storage of the same chain, so the Institute's withdrawal must cost the record nothing; (d) resolved (2026-10-02): commitments of exchanges no orchestrator carries are stored by no one, because a frontend that is not federated is not a member; the bylaws draft no longer assigns them. + +**Inherits:** cross-community exchange bound by the chain (line 5); append-only (line 6); privacy floor (line 7, entry 2); no chokepoint (line 11); public-chain record topology (REC-public-chain); lean, auditable code (P-lean-code); the Institute's money is not the federation's (bylaws §9.7); self-binding and succession (bylaws §13.1, §13.3); sybil resistance (entry 8); record permanence (entry 11). + +## 13. Witness adjudication against the operator + +**Status:** rule resolved in draft (2026-10-02); procedure open + +Decided by the principal on 2026-10-02: a dispute between a prosumer and the operator of its own platform is ruled on by witnesses, never by the operator. The official document's Covenant layer and bylaws §10.9 now say so, and the dispute-mechanics design's §3 carries the case. An earlier draft's third witness, drawn at random for each dispute so the bench would be odd and partly unknown to the operator in advance, was not carried; it rests on undecided rules for witness independence and the witness draw. + +Raised by the verification of that decision and open: (a) neutrality — the witnesses are paid by the operator they now judge, their copies of the record last while it pays them, and it rates them as a party, so the bench's pay, evidence and part of its reputation sit with the respondent; "independent" is nowhere defined; (b) a split bench — the minimum bench is two and nothing says what a one-to-one split yields; (c) filing — the design gives standing to record holders of an exchange and its filing commitment references an exchange, but custody, the credit limit and Article X duties need not involve one; (d) the dispute window — under bylaws §10.5 the operator's own rules set it for disputes against itself; (e) execution — the operator runs the ledger and executes every remedy, including one against itself, with no stated consequence if it does not; (f) forum — a prosumer contesting its own operator's switch to mutual credit is sent both to the witnesses (§10.9) and to the federation's ratings (§11.4, §12.5); (g) recusal — nothing stops a party from rating or voting on its own referral or petition in a federation; (h) discipline — witnesses are rated, but no text gives those ratings any effect on assignment. + +**Inherits:** cross-platform witness adjudication (COV-witness-adjudication, entry 6); witness minimum (REC-witness-minimum, entry 4); witnessing as compensated substrate work (REC-witness-work); adjudicators rated (COV-adjudicators); escrow custody disclosed (bylaws §10.2 Custody); line 10. diff --git a/janus-facing-architecture-amendment-2026-09-22.md b/janus-facing-architecture-amendment-2026-09-22.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ff0482 --- /dev/null +++ b/janus-facing-architecture-amendment-2026-09-22.md @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +# Amendment to the Official Document of the Janus Facing Architecture + +**Draft · 2026-09-22 · proceeds under P1-001 §9.2** + +Prepared for the delegates. The official document is amended only by a majority vote of the delegates, each federation having decided under §6.5, and the amendment is not adopted until the conformance suite passes against the amended text (§9.2). During bootstrap (§16.1) the founder board exercises the powers of the membership; an adoption so made is recorded in the governance registry (§9.5) as a bootstrap act and stands open to the membership under §2.3. + +**Sequence.** This amendment precedes the P1-001 v1.1 draft. The v1.1 amendment dated the same day was superseded on 2026-09-30 by the consistency-pass v1.1 (bylaws PR #4), which carries the prosumer member's federation election in §3.9; that election rests on the membership path Section 1 names. Adopted in the other order, the bylaws would exceed the official document in the sense of §15.2 for the interval between the two acts. Where both are adopted in a single bootstrap act, this amendment is recorded first. + +**Base.** This amendment is written against the document as it reads with the six editorial revisions of 2026-09-17 applied — pull requests #9 through #14, open at the time of drafting. Section 1 is unaffected by them. Section 2 is: see its own note. + +--- + +## What this amendment does + +1. Names prosumer standing as a path into membership of the stewardship organization, on the terms its bylaws provide. *(Governance layer, orchestrator tier.)* **Revised 2026-10-01:** by decision of the principal, the placement of the prosumer member's vote in the Covenant or Governance federation, and the weight of a federation's vote, are bylaw matters and are no longer carried in the amended text; P1-001 v1.1 §3.4, §3.8 and §3.9 (bylaws PR #4) carry them. +2. Names who adjudicates a dispute between a prosumer and the operator of its own platform: the witness layer, never the operator. *(Covenant layer.)* Severable from Section 1. +3. Instructs the conformance suite and the invariant registry. + +It touches none of the twelve lines. + +--- + +## Section 1 — Governance layer, orchestrator tier + +**Current text.** + +> Membership in the Network Theory Applied Research Institute, obtained by operating a federated instance of JFA software. + +**Amended text.** + +> Membership in the Network Theory Applied Research Institute, obtained by operating a federated instance of JFA software, or by participating as a prosumer on a federated platform as the organization's bylaws provide. + +**Rationale.** + +Institutional Discipline says that where leaving is dear, members get a vote. A prosumer's exit is dear once its credit is sovereign and non-convertible (Lines 2 and 3). The document gave that prosumer standing to challenge — through the Covenant tier's adjudication — but no vote; the only membership it named was the operator's, whose exit is the cheap one (fork the code, keep the record). The bylaws (P1-001 v1.0 §3.8) supplied the vote, but the document did not recognize the membership they created, §15.2 subordinates the bylaws to the document, and the bylaws' own preamble still describes Governance orchestration as the relationships among operator-members. A vote resting on an instrument the architecture can be read to forbid is a paper check. This section moves the vote into the architecture. + +*Revised 2026-10-01: the two paragraphs that follow record reasoning that now lives in the bylaws (P1-001 v1.1 §3.4, §3.8, §3.9, §5.3). The amended text above no longer places the vote or fixes its weight; the architecture names the membership and the bylaws say where it sits.* + +Two federations rather than one, because the two things a prosumer has an interest in are held in two places: the covenant — the social contract that governs how it is treated in trade — and governance — the audit of the stack against the standard. Each prosumer places its vote where its interest lies. The bylaws carry the mechanics (recognition, election, the annual change) and the document carries only the structure. + +One vote per federation however large its roll is Shared Responsibility applied to weight: headcount decides within a federation and never beyond it, so no federation can be bought by recruitment. This last sentence of the amended text is severable; if the membership prefers to keep weight a bylaw matter, strike it and the rest stands. + +**Registry.** + +No registered invariant was anchored to the current sentence — the `GOV-*` identifiers were retired to the bylaws level on 2026-08-27 — so no anchor update under §9.16 is carried and no descendant identifier is issued. Proposed new invariants, bound to *instrument* (P1-001): + +- `GOV-prosumer-membership` — a prosumer of a federated platform may take up membership of the stewardship organization on the terms its bylaws provide. + +*Withdrawn 2026-10-01, before issue:* `GOV-federation-election` and `GOV-one-vote-per-federation`, proposed in the 2026-09-22 draft. The rules they would have bound are bylaw matters (P1-001 v1.1 §3.9, §3.8). Neither identifier was ever issued, so §9.16 does not reserve them. + +--- + +## Section 2 — Covenant layer *(severable)* + +**Current text.** + +> Exit here is dear. Being cast out of the covenant costs a prosumer the one thing that cannot be rebuilt quickly — the count of exchanges at each rating level, earned one witnessed exchange at a time. That price is why expulsion is adjudicated rather than assumed. When apparent breaches of the covenant occur, platform operators adjudicate between their prosumers; disputes that cross platforms are adjudicated at the witness layer. Adjudicators are rated on their conduct by both prosumers/operators involved — the referees stand inside the reputation system they enforce. + +**Amended text.** + +> Exit here is dear. Being cast out of the covenant costs a prosumer the one thing that cannot be rebuilt quickly — the count of exchanges at each rating level, earned one witnessed exchange at a time. That price is why expulsion is adjudicated rather than assumed. When apparent breaches of the covenant occur, platform operators adjudicate between their prosumers; disputes that cross platforms, and disputes between a prosumer and the operator of its own platform, are adjudicated at the witness layer — no operator adjudicates a dispute to which it is a party. Adjudicators are rated on their conduct by both prosumers/operators involved — the referees stand inside the reputation system they enforce. + +**Note on the target.** These sentences stood in the Covenant layer's orchestrator tier until the editorial revision of 2026-09-17, which moved them into the layer's own paragraph, where the exit cost that explains them is stated (PR #9), and wrote out "Economy & Information" in the tier they left (PR #13). The amendment is applied where the sentences now stand. Nothing of its substance turns on the move: the same two sentences are amended in the same way, and the orchestrator tier is left as the editorial revision leaves it. + +**Rationale.** + +The document named who adjudicates two of three cases. The third — a prosumer against its own operator — is the case that arises at the credit limit, at custody, and at the stage change, where the prosumer's exit is dearest; and the operator is not neutral in it by the document's own reasoning for cross-platform disputes. Because the document was silent, the bylaws may fill the gap without overriding it; naming the witness layer here nonetheless protects P1-001 §10.9 under §15.2 and lets the rule be registered as an invariant rather than carried as a bylaw alone. + +**Registry.** + +Proposed `COV-operator-dispute-witnesses` — a dispute between a prosumer and the operator of its own platform is adjudicated at the witness layer, never by that operator. Bound to *instrument* (P1-001 §10.9) and to *implementation* (a platform's dispute routing). Lineage: `COV-operators-adjudicate`, `COV-witness-adjudication`. + +--- + +## Section 3 — Conformance + +Run `python jfa-conformance-suite.py` against the amended text before the delegates' vote closes; the amendment is not adopted until it passes (§9.2). The registry changes above are made in the same act (§9.16); an identifier once issued is never reused. A failing run is entered in `OPEN-QUESTIONS.md` and stands as business in the Governance Federation Channel under §9.18 until resolved by repair of the suite or by amendment of the text. + +--- + +## Not amended, noted + +**Line 10.** The P1-001 v1.1 amendment adds ratification by the deployment's prosumers as a condition of a switch to *full* mutual credit (§11.1(d)). Line 10 states minimum conditions and is not crossed by an added one, so the Line is left as it stands. If the membership later judges that the ratification should bind every conforming implementation and not only the Institute's members, it belongs in Line 10 and comes back under §9.2. + +**Record layer, witness minimum.** Rotation of the standing witnesses, the third witness drawn per dispute, and the definition of independence are instrument-level (P1-001 §3.2(b), §3.10, §10.2, §10.9) and do not change the document's two-witness floor. + +**Structure article, "Between Federations."** The bylaws' appendix sources prosumer membership to this article, which is held in NTARI's document store and not published. Publish it, or fold its operative content into the amended Governance tier; a demand sourced to an unpublished paper is self-attested under §9.6. + +--- + +## Provenance of demands + +*Informative, not operative.* + +| Section | Demand | Source | +| --- | --- | --- | +| §1 | Where leaving is dear, members get a vote; the prosumer's exit is dear under sovereign, non-convertible credit | Official document, Principles (Institutional Discipline); Lines 2, 3 | +| §1 | The community that coordinates is the community that checks | Official document, Principles (Shared Responsibility); P1-001 §2.1 | +| §1 | Bylaws may not override the official document | P1-001 §15.2; §1.5 | +| §1 | Prosumer standing ripens into membership; the vote comes with it | P1-001 §3.8, §4.2; structure article, "Between Federations" (unpublished) | +| §1 | One vote per federation; headcount decides within and never beyond | P1-001 §3.4, §5.3 | +| §2 | No one is neutral in their own case | Official document, Covenant Layer (cross-platform reasoning); P1-001 §10.9 | +| §2 | A power names its check | P1-001 §2.2 | +| §3 | Registry changes are amendments; identifiers never reused; failing suite is business | P1-001 §9.2, §9.16, §9.18 | + +--- + +## Adoption record *(to be completed)* + +- Notice published to the Governance Federation Channel under §6.4: ________ +- Federation decisions under §6.5 — Substrate: ____ Record: ____ Covenant: ____ Governance: ____ E&I: ____ +- Delegates' vote under §9.2: ________ +- Conformance suite result against the amended text: ________ +- Registry changes recorded under §9.16: ________ +- Recorded in the governance registry under §9.5 (bootstrap act, if so): ________ + +--- + +*Network Theory Applied Research Institute, Inc. — EIN 92-3047136 — Louisville, Kentucky — * + +*Specification: CC BY-SA 4.0* diff --git a/janus-facing-architecture.md b/janus-facing-architecture.md index 40a753a..3923136 100644 --- a/janus-facing-architecture.md +++ b/janus-facing-architecture.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ NTARI's research locates this failure in infrastructure itself. Deliberative sys The Janus Facing Architecture (JFA) is organized into five functional layers — Substrate, Record, Covenant, Governance, and Economy & Information (E&I) — each implemented in three tiers: the frontend — for prosumer collaboration; the orchestrator — a backend providing overlapping coordination across geographic communities; and the underlying protocol — the pattern for securely handling data across tiers. -JFA software is designed for release and management in a copyleft environment, generally the GNU Affero General Public License, allowing new frontends, federations, protocols and architectures to evolve in the global market, forming a free software commons. +JFA software is designed for release and management in a copyleft environment, generally the GNU Affero General Public License, version 3 or later (AGPL-3.0-or-later), allowing new frontends, federations, protocols and architectures to evolve in the global market, forming a free software commons. This is the official document, stewarded by Network Theory Applied Research Institute, Inc. Prior instruments are preserved in [Historical Docs](Historical%20Docs/); concepts carried from them are recorded in the [concept triage](jfa-concept-triage-2026-08-24.md); what remains unresolved is named in [OPEN-QUESTIONS.md](OPEN-QUESTIONS.md). @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Every system that coordinates people exercises power over them, whether it means **Shared Responsibility.** The community that coordinates the economy is the same community that checks the coordination. The two functions are exchanged continuously — never split into rulers and ruled. -**Institutional Discipline.** Each layer is disciplined by the cost of leaving it — what a member forfeits by walking out, and what a community forfeits by casting someone out. Where leaving is cheap, competition disciplines: the Substrate and Economy & Information layers. Where leaving is dear, members get a vote: the Covenant and Governance layers. Where leaving is impossible, decisions stay open to challenge: the Record layer. Each layer names its own cost below, because that cost is what decides how a fight there gets settled. +**Institutional Discipline.** Each layer is disciplined by the cost of leaving it — what a member forfeits by walking out, and what a community forfeits by casting someone out. Where leaving is cheap, competition disciplines: the Substrate and Economy & Information layers. Where leaving is dear, members get a vote: the Covenant and Governance layers. Where leaving is catastrophic, decisions stay open to challenge: the Record layer. Each layer names its own cost below, because that cost is what decides how a fight there gets settled. **Lean, auditable code.** Protocol software stays small, depends on nothing but its language's standard library, and is auditable whole. @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Every system that coordinates people exercises power over them, whether it means This is the hardware where everything happens, owned by prosumers of CPUs, GPUs, printers, storage and sensors. -Exit here is cheap, and expulsion costs a prosumer nothing but a connection. An orchestrator that refuses to carry your capacity has not taken your hardware, your balances or your history, and another orchestrator is one published offer away. Quarrels at this layer are therefore not adjudicated: a carry that goes unattested inside its commitment window simply reverts, nobody rules on it, and a carrier that expels or fails too freely is undercut rather than appealed to. +Exit here is cheap, and a carrier's refusal costs a prosumer nothing but a connection. An orchestrator that refuses to carry your capacity has not taken your hardware, your balances or your history, and another orchestrator is one published offer away. Quarrels at this layer are therefore not adjudicated: a carry that goes unattested inside its commitment window simply reverts, nobody rules on it, and a carrier that refuses or fails too freely is undercut rather than appealed to. ### Protocol Tier @@ -52,11 +52,11 @@ Economy & Information interface for prosuming compute/storage. A compensated function of the substrate, recording and serving dialog between Economy & Information and Covenant layers for the public. -The record of what happened is held six ways. Each party to a transaction keeps a record of their own; the operator keeps its own; two witnesses keep their own; and the hashes are committed to one public chain, distributed across the substrate — the record for everyone who was neither transactor, witness, nor operator. The chain is append-only: harm is forgiven by annotation, never by erasing. A platform must have at least two independent witnesses; with fewer, a deployment must label itself unfederated. +The record of what happened is held by six parties: the two prosumers to the exchange, the operator, the orchestrator, and two witnesses each keep a record of their own. The hashes are also committed to one public chain, distributed across the substrate — the record for everyone who holds none of their own. The commitments of every exchange carried by an orchestrator are copied to the chain and stored on substrate funded by the stewardship organization of the Governance layer, so the record that binds communities to one another is paid for by none of them. The chain is append-only: harm is forgiven by annotation, never by erasing. A platform must have at least two independent witnesses; with fewer, a deployment must label itself unfederated. -Nobody can be expelled from the record, and nobody can leave it. What was committed stays committed, and the hash on the public chain outlives the operator, the frontend and the quarrel. Because there is no exit to hold over anyone, no finding here is ever final: a disputed entry is answered by annotation, and the annotation is as permanent as the entry it answers. +Nobody can be deleted from the record, and leaving it is catastrophic. What was committed is never erased, but no single copy is the record, and each copy lasts only as long as it is kept: the orchestrator's with the last paid carry, the witnesses' while the operator pays them, the prosumers' and operator's own until they stop keeping them, and the chain's for as long as its storage is funded. The record survives in whichever copies remain; the chain is stored by the substrate rather than by the operator, so it can outlive the operator, the frontend and the quarrel, and what it carries past every holder is the fact of commitment, not the content. Because nothing can be deleted from the record, no finding here is ever final: a disputed entry is answered by annotation, and the annotation is as permanent as the entry it answers. -A cross-community exchange remains two sovereign spends. The citation that settles it carries a third: the orchestrator's transport fee, escrowed with the trade at initiation and released by that same citation. Release is joint and all-or-nothing — if delivery is not attested within the offer's commitment window, all three spends revert — and the orchestrator's own attestation does not count toward the threshold that releases its own fee. The fee settles in the home ledger of the prosumers whose capacity was carried; it does not cross a community boundary. The credit it earns is held the same six ways, cited by key. +A cross-community exchange remains two sovereign spends. The citation that settles it carries the orchestrator's transport fee as well, escrowed with the trade at initiation and released by that same citation. Release is joint and all-or-nothing — if delivery is not attested within the offer's commitment window, every spend reverts — and the orchestrator's own attestation does not count toward the threshold that releases its own fee. The fee is split between the home ledgers of the two prosumers whose trade was carried, each paying its share in its own unit; nothing crosses a community boundary. The credit it earns is held by the same six parties, cited by key. ### Protocol Tier @@ -74,7 +74,9 @@ The buying and selling of record storage across the substrate, compensating the A social contract enforced in code, informing flexible expectations for prosumer interactions. -Exit here is dear. Being cast out of the covenant costs a prosumer the one thing that cannot be rebuilt quickly — the count of exchanges at each rating level, earned one witnessed exchange at a time. That price is why expulsion is adjudicated rather than assumed. When apparent breaches of the covenant occur, platform operators adjudicate between their prosumers; disputes that cross platforms are adjudicated at the witness layer. Adjudicators are rated on their conduct by both prosumers/operators involved — the referees stand inside the reputation system they enforce. +Exit here is dear. A prosumer barred from a platform keeps the record of every rating they earned there — six parties hold it — but the standing it carries does not follow them by default: on the next platform, the count of exchanges at each rating level is rebuilt one witnessed exchange at a time. That price is why a bar rests on adjudicated evidence rather than an operator's word. When apparent breaches of the covenant occur, platform operators adjudicate between their prosumers; disputes that cross platforms, and disputes between a prosumer and the operator of its own platform, are adjudicated at the witness layer — no operator adjudicates a dispute to which it is a party. Wherever adjudication occurs, the parties to it rate the adjudicator — the operator between its own prosumers, the witnesses otherwise — so the referees stand inside the reputation system they enforce. + +Because exit is dear, members vote here: the Covenant federation votes on conceptual and programmatic changes to the covenant (the Leveson-Based Trade Assessment Scale, LBTAS), its API and its orchestration, and commissions formal studies of the chosen covenant's effects on its users. ### Protocol Tier @@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ The Economy & Information interface where the API is served. This is where and how humans assemble to collaboratively act on the stack. -Exit here is dear, and this is the only layer where expulsion reaches the software itself: a member cast out of the Institute loses the vote that shapes what everyone else runs. So expulsion is never an operator's decision — it is referred and decided by vote under the bylaws, on the record, and the delegates who carry that vote are recallable by the members who seated them. +Exit here is dear, and this is the only layer where expulsion reaches the software itself: a member expelled from the Institute loses, for a bounded term, the vote that shapes what everyone else runs. So expulsion is never an operator's decision — it is referred to the Governance federation and decided by its members' vote under the bylaws, on the record. ### Protocol Tier @@ -100,7 +102,7 @@ Nonprofit, copyleft software stewardship organization. ### Orchestrator Tier -Membership in the Network Theory Applied Research Institute, obtained by operating a federated instance of JFA software. +Membership in the Network Theory Applied Research Institute, obtained by operating a federated instance of JFA software or by participating as a prosumer on a federated platform. ### Frontend Tier @@ -110,7 +112,7 @@ The synchronous/asynchronous coordination of members governed by the organizatio The Economy & Information layer is hosted on substrate, syndicated with the record layer, and facilitates covenant compliance. -Exit here is cheap by construction. An operator may bar a prosumer from its platform but not from what they built there: positions and history survive any frontend, so the expelled leave with their record intact and their balances still owed. Expulsion is a loss of market, not a loss of standing — and an operator whose terms or credit limit drive prosumers out loses the trade rather than winning the argument. +Exit here is cheap by construction. An operator may bar a prosumer from its platform but not from what they built there: positions and history survive any frontend, so the barred leave with their record intact and their balances still owed. A bar is a loss of market, not a loss of standing — and an operator whose terms or credit limit drive prosumers out loses the trade rather than winning the argument. ### Protocol Tier @@ -161,4 +163,4 @@ Toffler, A. (1980). *The Third Wave*. William Morrow. *Network Theory Applied Research Institute, Inc. — 501(c)(3) — EIN 92-3047136 — info@ntari.org* -*Software: AGPL-3.0 · Specification: CC BY-SA 4.0* +*Software: AGPL-3.0-or-later · Specification: CC BY-SA 4.0* diff --git a/jfa-conformance-suite.py b/jfa-conformance-suite.py index f51e830..014a6d9 100644 --- a/jfa-conformance-suite.py +++ b/jfa-conformance-suite.py @@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ Invariant("SUB-no-inbound-requirement", "substrate", "without requiring open inbound ports or a static address", "implementation", "node tests: a node registers, heartbeats, polls for work and reports over outbound connections only - no listening port, no static IP, behind NAT/CGNAT and dynamic addressing; the residential case of L11 (new 2026-09-08)"), # Record layer — the topology - Invariant("REC-six-holders", "record", "held six ways", - "implementation", "record tests: each transactor, the operator, and both witnesses keep records beside the chain (was REC-four-holders; recounted 2026-08-27)"), + Invariant("REC-six-holders", "record", "held by six parties", + "implementation", "record tests: each of the two prosumers, the operator, the orchestrator, and both witnesses keep records beside the chain (was REC-four-holders; recounted 2026-08-27; orchestrator added and anchor retracked 2026-09-30)"), Invariant("REC-public-chain", "record", "one public chain distributed across the substrate", "implementation", "record tests: single public chain on substrate serving non-parties (reverses old 9.3)"), Invariant("REC-truth-not-currency", "record", "never a currency unit", @@ -109,16 +109,23 @@ Invariant("REC-witness-work", "record", "compensating the prosumers who keep the record", "implementation", "substrate tests: record-keeping and witnessing assigned as compensated substrate work (reworded 2026-08-27; anchor retracked to the frontend market wording 2026-09-17)"), # Covenant layer - Invariant("COV-adjudicators", "covenant", "rated on their conduct by both prosumers", - "implementation", "covenant tests: adjudication conduct ratable by both parties (was 7.2-adjudicator-rated)"), + Invariant("COV-adjudicators", "covenant", "the parties to it rate the adjudicator", + "implementation", "covenant tests: adjudication conduct ratable by the parties to the adjudication - the operator on a platform, the witnesses across platforms (was 7.2-adjudicator-rated; anchor retracked 2026-09-30)"), Invariant("COV-operators-adjudicate", "covenant", "platform operators adjudicate between their prosumers", "implementation", "dispute tests: adjudication of apparent covenant breaches performed by platform operators (new 2026-08-25)"), Invariant("COV-witness-adjudication", "covenant", "adjudicated at the witness layer", "implementation", "dispute tests: cross-platform disputes adjudicated by the exchange's witnesses (new 2026-08-25)"), + Invariant("COV-operator-dispute-witnesses", "covenant", "no operator adjudicates a dispute to which it is a party", + "instrument", "P1-001 §10.9 routes a prosumer's dispute with its own operator to that platform's standing witnesses; dispute tests: a platform's routing never seats an operator on its own case (new 2026-09-22; lineage COV-operators-adjudicate, COV-witness-adjudication)"), # Governance and E&I operational detail (delegates/recall, reopening decided # matters, operator economic management, the hybrid definition) moved to the # bylaws and companion-article level on 2026-08-27; GOV-delegates, GOV-reopen, # EI-operator-economy and EI-hybrid are retired from this registry. + # Governance layer — membership and the franchise, returned to the document + # on 2026-09-22 because a vote resting on an instrument the architecture can + # be read to forbid is a paper check (amendment of 2026-09-22, §1). + Invariant("GOV-prosumer-membership", "governance", "by participating as a prosumer on a federated platform", + "instrument", "P1-001 §§3.3, 3.8: a prosumer of a federated platform may take up membership of the stewardship organization on the terms its bylaws provide (new 2026-09-22)"), # The lines that cannot be crossed Invariant("L1", "lines", "always summing to zero", "implementation", "economy tests: each exchange moves two balances netting to zero (was 7.1-zero-sum)"), @@ -164,8 +171,10 @@ LINE_COUNT = 12 # Product names must not appear anywhere: the document is product-agnostic. +# LBTAS is the covenant, not a product, and may be named wherever the Covenant +# layer label would otherwise be undefined (principal's decision, 2026-09-30). PRODUCT_NAMES = ["Sohocloud", "SoHoLINK", "Cloudy", "Slack", "Discord", "Mycelium", - "LBTAS", "Agrinet", "NTARI/OS", "GitHub", "Wix", "Fruitful"] + "Agrinet", "NTARI/OS", "GitHub", "Wix", "Fruitful"] # Concepts the 2026-08-24 triage retired or reversed; their anchor phrases # must NOT reappear in the document.