diff --git a/index.bs b/index.bs index d7b004f..5bdc855 100644 --- a/index.bs +++ b/index.bs @@ -128,6 +128,29 @@ spec: ECMASCRIPT; urlPrefix: https://tc39.es/ecma262/ "href": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.13359", "title": "Sockpuppetting: Jailbreaking LLMs by Combining Prefilling with Optimization", "publisher": "arXiv" + }, + "agenticweb-wg": { + "href": "https://w3c.github.io/charter-drafts/2026/agenticweb-wg.html", + "title": "Agentic Web Working Group Charter", + "publisher": "W3C" + }, + "chrome-agent-security": { + "href": "https://developer.chrome.com/docs/agents/security", + "title": "Agent security considerations for WebMCP", + "authors": [ + "Julia Pagnucco", + "Alexandra Klepper" + ], + "publisher": "Google Chrome Developers" + }, + "chrome-secure-tools": { + "href": "https://developer.chrome.com/docs/ai/webmcp/secure-tools", + "title": "Secure tools with WebMCP", + "authors": [ + "Julia Pagnucco", + "Alexandra Klepper" + ], + "publisher": "Google Chrome Developers" } } @@ -1606,6 +1629,20 @@ This section assumes [=agents=] operate with certain baseline capabilities that These capabilities enable powerful user experiences but also create new risks that must be addressed through a combination of protocol design, agent implementation, and user controls. +Many of the risks associated with these baseline capabilities—such as indirect prompt injection from +untrusted web content, cross-origin data correlation, and unauthorized actions within an +authenticated session—apply broadly to any [=agent=] operating on the web on a user's behalf, +regardless of whether a site exposes WebMCP tools. While WebMCP provides protocol-level boundaries +and semantic hints ({{ToolAnnotations/readOnlyHint}}, {{ToolAnnotations/consequentialHint}}, +{{ToolAnnotations/untrustedContentHint}}), a malicious site can omit or misrepresent those hints. + +Preventing an [=agent=] from being manipulated by an untrusted site or inappropriately disclosing +cross-origin data is primarily the responsibility of the [=agent=]'s own security model rather than +something this specification can normatively enforce. Broader standardization and guidance around +[=agent=] identity, permissions, delegation, and web interactions are being explored in the proposed +[Agentic Web Working Group](https://w3c.github.io/charter-drafts/2026/agenticweb-wg.html) +[[AGENTICWEB-WG]]. +

Key Security and Privacy Risks

Prompt Injection Attacks

@@ -1973,6 +2010,24 @@ page, protecting against malicious scripts or dependencies from using WebMCP API **How:** A boolean {{ToolAnnotations/consequentialHint}} annotation acts as a signal to the client or agent that the tool performs a consequential action, such as booking a flight or transferring money. This way they can selectively enforce mandatory user confirmation prompts before executing high-stakes tools, directly mitigating the risk of accidental or malicious misrepresentation of intent. +

Agent-Level Guardrails and Best Practices

+ +**What:** Deterministic and probabilistic guardrails enforced by the [=agent=] when consuming WebMCP +tools. + +**Threats addressed:** [[#prompt-injection]], [[#misrepresentation-of-intent]], +[[#privacy-leakage-over-parameterization]] + +**How:** Because websites registering WebMCP tools may themselves be untrusted or compromised, +[=agents=] cannot rely solely on site-asserted tool descriptions or annotations for security. +Defining the architecture of a secure browser-use [=agent=] is outside the scope of this +specification; however, [=agent=] implementers are strongly encouraged to implement defense-in-depth +guardrails. For external implementation guidance on securing [=agents=] and tools that use WebMCP, +see [[CHROME-AGENT-SECURITY]] and [[CHROME-SECURE-TOOLS]]. Broader cross-ecosystem discussions on +expressing policies, constraints, and guidance for [=agent=] interactions on the web are also +underway in the proposed [Agentic Web Working +Group](https://w3c.github.io/charter-drafts/2026/agenticweb-wg.html) [[AGENTICWEB-WG]]. +

Accessibility considerations